Introduction: What is a Thing by Reynolds, Nicholas & Librett, Jeffrey S
Konturen VIII (2015) 1 
 Introduction 
 What is a Thing?  
 Nicholas Reynolds 
 University of Oregon 
 Jeffrey Librett 
 University of Oregon 
 
     
   We look everywhere for the unconditioned (das Unbedingte),  
   and find only things (Dinge).  
   (Novalis, Pollen, 1798)  
 
   Thoughts without content are empty,  
   intuitions without concepts are blind.  
   (Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) 
 
 
Since Immanuel Kant's intervention in the debates between rationalism and 
empiricism, thinking about things has had to contend with his formulation of the 
radical distinction between "objects of experience" and "things in themselves": i.e. 
on the one hand, things whose appearing and appearance are subject (or 
relative) to the conditions of the way in which we can have experience at all, and 
on the other hand, the absolute reality of what is, the essence of things.  The 
innumerable displacements of this opposition--in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and 
Marx, in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the modern phenomenologists, in literary 
(and scientific) writings, and in connection with technological and social changes 
from the late eighteenth century until today--frame the conceptual and figurative 
history of things in post-Enlightenment modernity.  Further, the conceptual terms 
defining the appearance of things after Kant have turned largely around the 
question of whether or not things that we experience need be (and if so, how 
they can be) synthetically constructed in our consciousness out of intuitions 
(above all conceived as images) and concepts.  It is therefore not surprising that 
contemporary discussions of the thing continue to wrestle with the question of the 
interrelationship between images and concepts (or material and ideal 
dimensions) in the constitution of objects of experience, as we see in the essays 
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that follow.  In addition, the question of things today obviously involves a large 
cluster of debates concerning representation, language, and semiosis.  Indeed, 
in Kant the objects of consciousness were already construed as representations 
(Vorstellungen), and much of post-Kantian philosophy (e.g. in Hegel, in 
Schopenhauer, and in Heidegger) has persistently attempted to go beyond 
representations, by way of resistance to Kant's denial of access to things-in-
themselves.  In contrast, the twentieth century "linguistic turn" has extended the 
thought of representation into the most diverse and challenging reflections on 
language as constitutive for thought.  Against the background of this history, any 
questioning of the thing today must concern itself with the potentially constitutive 
role of linguistic, semiotic, and rhetorical dimensions for the experience of things 
(whether that experience be, for example, an epistemic, an ethical, an aesthetic, 
a religious, a political, or an erotic one).    
 The current Special Issue took as its point of departure a combined faculty 
and graduate student conference on the question of "What is a Thing?" held at 
the University of Oregon on February 20-21, 2014, which was conceptualized 
and organized by Nicholas Reynolds.1  The essays published here represent a 
refereed selection from the papers presented at the conference, in addition to 
further invited and refereed contributions, intended to increase the range of 
perspectives and topics represented in this Issue.   The articles take up the 
general aspects of "thing"-ness, as indicated above, with reference to modernist 
and contemporary philosophy and theory, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies, 
and they treat, in addition, questions of poetics and aesthetics in both lyric poetry 
and the novel.  
 Jonathan Monroe opens the Issue by discussing the manner in which 
"things" are treated in modern and contemporary poetry and poetics.   
Specifically, he questions the ideology of the "thing-as-image" or "image-as-
thing" that has enjoyed a certain hegemony since early twentieth century 
modernism. He argues that this belated and denegated doctrine of the symbol--
present in one way in the Anglo-American imagist tradition since Ezra Pound and 
William Carlos Williams ("no ideas but in things"), and differently also in the 
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doctrine of the Rilkean Dinggedicht--illusorily attempts to prevent the poetic thing 
from separating from itself and dispersing its own (and its reader's) presence, for 
example into its intellectual, affective, signifying, rhetorical, or discursive 
components and preconditions.  Monroe proposes and describes, as his main 
example of a radical contemporary alternative to this model (where he construes 
the term "contemporary" with reference to Giorgio Agamben's writings) the poetry 
of Rosmarie Waldrop, especially in her book Driven to Abstraction.  The issue 
opens, then, with the question of the place and placement of the (aesthetic) thing 
with respect to the binary oppositions of image and concept, sensuous 
concretion and supersensuous abstraction, and with the question of how these 
oppositions relate to language and representation, questions that will recur in 
various forms throughout the remaining essays.  There follow two essays that 
draw principally on phenemonological and post-phenomenological philosophical 
thought; then four that work in diverse ways with the psychoanalytic and 
deconstructive approaches to fetishism.    
 Rochelle Tobias traces the close affinity between Rainer Maria Rilke's 
poetry and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, in particular the fact that 
both of these figures question the distinction between self and world, which they 
construe as meeting within consciousness.  Phenomenological "bracketing" 
becomes in Rilke's poetry, for Tobias, "the condition for the making of art and, 
more generally, for the making of meaning."  The chiasmic inscription of self and 
world within each other, in Tobias's account, is one version of the disruption of 
the binary opposition between image and concept for which Monroe's essay 
calls.  (It would be interesting to read this essay in conjunction with Thomas 
Schestag's essay, "Twombly's Roses," published in an earlier issue of this journal 
[Konturen, V].  Both essays undertake readings of Rilke's figures of roses from 
related but distinct perspectives.)   
 In contrast to the consciousness-centered phenomenology of Husserl, 
David Appelbaum focuses his remarks, which follow in the traditions of Martin 
Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, on the interpretation of the "thing" as an "event" 
whose arrival evades us even as it occurs. He unfolds the indeterminability of the 
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event in time (because it escapes punctual presentation or representation), in 
space (because it remains at a distance), and in ontological status (because it 
can be determined neither as ideal nor as real and both: as virtually real).   
Reflecting on the event of his own spoken presentation on the thing-as-event, 
Appelbaum strikingly characterizes the precarious simultaneity of the occurrence 
and non-occurrence of this very presentation.   
 In a manner equally attentive to the lessons of rhetorical deconstruction 
and psychoanalysis, Erica Weitzman explores the literature of realism in its 
attempt to portray things as they are.  Much more specifically, she writes on the 
difficult and threatening status of the "thing" as a potential fetish in Theodor 
Fontane's novella, Grete Minde.  Notably, she examines the ways in which the 
novella's problematization of fetishistically constituted "things" casts a critical light 
on the conditions of its own aesthetic specificity as an instance of "poetic 
realism." Through a detailed reading, Weitzman shows how the iconoclastic 
anxieties of the post-Reformation period in which the novella is set--anxieties 
concerning the functioning of a "thing" as an image that would falsely be thought 
to contain an absent spiritual meaning--necessarily and appropriately repeat 
themselves as the anxieties of the realist author concerning his or her own 
project: the representation of material realities as containing more than just blind, 
senseless particularity.  Here again, the problem of the thing as a possible 
conjunction of image and concept in the presentation of the object itself is 
centrally at stake.   
 From Weitzman to McNulty, we move from fetishism as a problem for 
poetic realism to fetishism as a resource for speculative realism.  McNulty takes 
as her point of departure the new ontologies of thingliness, specifically Quentin 
Meillassoux's version of speculative realism.  Notably, Meillassoux questions the 
"linguistic turn" of modern philosophy, mentioned above, for what he takes to be 
its failure to envision an actual encounter with the object or thing.  Instead of 
remaining fixated on language as obstacle to an immediate grasp of things as 
they are, Meillassoux proposes mathematics--in a neo-Cartesian vein--as the 
privileged discursive modality of immediate human access to the world of 
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nonhuman objects.  With reference especially to the work of Deleuze and the 
later Lacan, McNulty interprets Meillassoux's move as a fetishization of 
mathematics.  Far from condemning it as such, however, she takes this move as 
an occasion for reflection on the positive philosophical interest and potential of 
fetishism in general, beyond the aspect of disavowal, which she nonetheless 
acknowledges.  Rather than the fetishism of speculative realism, then, it is the 
speculative realism of fetishism more generally that is ultimately her topic here.  
According to McNulty, fetishism introduces a "radically new object" in the sense 
that it constructs, rather than merely discovers, the real.  In this construction, the 
maternal phallus actually functions as a figure for the death drive, through a 
modality of figuration that takes on plastic connotations beyond the dimensions of 
the semiotic signifier.  In exceeding both the symbolic and the imaginary 
registers, the real at which fetishism aims would concern neither concept nor 
image, but what escapes this binary opposition.     Finally, McNulty argues that it 
is what Lacan calls das Ding ("the Thing")--as a psychic reality intimately within, 
and yet excluded from, the human subject--that is constructed by the speculative 
realism of perversion.  
 Daniel Wilson approaches the Lacanian conceptual figure of das Ding 
through an interest in its conceptual and terminological genealogy, which his 
article traces from John Stuart Mill to Sigmund Freud to Jacques Lacan.  Wilson 
approaches Lacan's notion of the psychic "thing" as the lost object, a 
psychoanalytic narrative trope on the thing-in-itself, which one continually seeks 
in vain, although it remains unconsciously at work in one's body.  To clarify its 
sense, Wilson compares and contrasts this notion of the "thing" with the notion of 
the "thing" as it functions within Freud's frequent discussion of the relationship 
between "representations-of-things" (Ding- or Sachvorstellungen) and 
"representations-of-words" (Wortvorstellungen).   In the Freudian oeuvre, 
"representations-of-things" constitute the contents of the unconscious, 
understood as a realm radically beyond language.  In turn, however, in order to 
clarify Freud's notion of "representations-of-things," Wilson shows how Freud 
derives it, in his early writings, from Mill's philosophy.  Thus, Wilson's genealogy 
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passes from Mill's thing in general, as a set of associated sensory impressions, 
to Freud's unconscious representations-of-things, which are known only indirectly 
through their effects, to the Lacanian version of the lost object as "the effects of 
language on the subject that are unaccounted for in language and that remain 
unaddressed to the Other."  Finally, Wilson illustrates the working of the Lacanian 
thing in the body of the subject, with reference to autobiographical writings by an 
autistic individual, Tito Mukhopadhyay.   
 With Eva Hoffmann's essay we reenter the domain of contemporary 
literature, this time in the form of novelistic prose. Hoffmann reads Orham 
Pamuk's novel, The Museum of Innocence, in terms of the Freudian concept of 
the fetish, as also in terms of the reinterpretation of the fetish--with application to 
cultural voids and narrative impasses--by recent theorists such as Anne 
McClintock and Gerhard Neumann., As a museal collector, Pamuk's melancholic 
protagonist inserts relic-like "things"--objects that have belonged to his 
essentially inaccessible beloved--into the gap between tradition and modernity, a 
wound in contemporary Turkish culture.  He thereby disavows and represents 
through one set of objects the intermingling of cultural and erotic loss (or trauma).  
Here, too, as in McNulty's analysis, the fetish marks--with its interplay of excess 
and lack--the limits of the signifier's effectiveness, as also the limits of the domain 
of stabilized imaginary identification.   
 In broadly divergent ways, then, the essays gathered here document a 
particular moment in the history of the question of the thing.  In this moment--our 
own "here and now"--the continuing persuasive authority of the "linguistic turn" 
(with its predominant structural-analytical imperative) maintains a productive 
tension with multiple counter-currents--whether from phenomenology, historicist 
cultural studies, object-oriented metaphysics, psychoanalysis, or aesthetic and 
poetic ideologies--that seek (perhaps unavoidably) a return to things themselves.  
The status of such a return--e.g. as image-work, consciousness, event, realistic 
narrative, fetish, or unconscious object--remains here at issue.   
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1 Thanks to the College of Arts and Sciences, the Department of German and 
Scandinavian, the German Studies Committee, the Departments of Philosophy 
and Comparative Literature, and the Oregon Humanities Center for supporting 
this conference.  Particular thanks are due further to Judith Lechner and Barbara 
Ver West for their invaluable organizational assistance.   
